Introduction
Harming individuals is generally considered to be A Bad Thing.
1 Given that many discussions in bioethics take as their starting point John Stuart Mill's influential maxim that '[t]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others', 2 whether something causes harm to other people is believed to determine the limits of acceptable conduct. What constitutes harm is also of enormous practical consequence as claims can only be brought in the tort of negligence, for example, if harm has occurred. Yet this definition has faced criticism from bioethicists who, believing it to be severely flawed, wish to replace it with their own theories of the concept. The first challenge came from Professor John Harris. In several books and articles he has proposed an alternative theory based upon whether a person is placed in a harmed state.
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He states 'Where B is in a condition that is harmed and A and/or C is responsible for B's being in that condition then A and/or C have harmed B'. 6 A harmed state, he says, will be one that a person has a rational preference not to be in.
The second opposition to the counterfactual account is more recent and comes from Dr Guy Kahane and Professor Julian Savulescu.
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They believe that Feinberg's comparative theory of harm fails to explain the intuitive reactions people have towards different conditions. Kahane and Savulescu hold that there is an important distinction between things such as being severely intellectually impaired or dying in one's twenties on the one hand, and things such as lacking an IQ of 160 or dying in one's hundred and thirties. They maintain that people see the former as harms but the latter as not and that the counterfactual account struggles to accommodate this distinction because Feinberg's theory perceives both scenarios as making an individual worse off and thus harmed. As a result, they propose that whether a condition is statistically normal will be a morally significant factor in determining whether a person is harmed or not: the former harmful conditions fall below what is statistically average whereas the latter non-harmful ones are not. Causing someone to be in a condition that is below what is statistically normal will be to cause them harm under this theory.
The purpose of this article is to defend the counterfactual account of harm from these two attacks. At first sight this might appear a rather esoteric debate. After all, blinding someone or causing them to contract Ebola is likely to cause harm under all three theories. However, In this article I will argue that the shortcomings Harris, Kahane and Savulescu believe are present in Feinberg's theory are illusory and that it is their own accounts of harm that are fraught with logical errors. The first part of this article will give an overview of Feinberg's theory. Harris's alternative account will then be addressed and I will explain why it is unconvincing. Next, Kahane and Savulescu's criticisms of the counterfactual account and their own theory of harm will be presented and rebutted. I will demonstrate that the arguments presented to refute Feinberg's theory not only fail to achieve this goal and can be accommodated within the counterfactual account but that they actually undermine the theories presented by their respective authors. The final conclusion will be that that these challenges are misconceived and fail to displace the counterfactual theory.
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The Counterfactual Account of Harm
Feinberg held that a person is harmed if their interests are put in a worse condition than they otherwise would have been. 12 The theory is therefore counterfactual as it compares what
actually happened with what otherwise would have been the case (the 'counterfacts'). Feinberg stated: 'A harms B only if his wrongful act leaves B worse off than he would be otherwise in the normal course of events insofar as they were reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances'.
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Note that a person does not have to be made worse off than they were before. To illustrate this Feinberg uses the example of a Miss America contestant being detained the night before the competition -a competition she was certain to win. Although she is not worse off than before (she was not a competition winner before the putatively harmful detention), she is still harmed by such actions as she is worse off than she otherwise would have been (she would have been a Miss America competition winner had the detention not occurred).
14 One might object that a problem with this account of harm is that of causal overdetermination. Feinberg asks us to imagine a businessman who takes a taxi to the airport.
On the way the reckless driving of the taxi driver causes a collision. The first challenge to the counterfactual account of harm is presented by Harris. 21 Harris believes that 'to be harmed is to be put in a condition that is harmful' 22 and explains that to be in a harmed condition is 'to be born with any impairment that one could have a rational preference to be born without.' 23 To illustrate this Harris uses a thought experiment of 'the emergency-room test'. 24 If a patient was brought into hospital in a condition that could only be rectified there and then and the medical staff would be negligent if they failed to correct it then the patient will be in a harmed state according to Harris. 25 Therefore when someone is in a condition they have a rational preference not to be in and another is responsible for this state of affairs then the latter will have harmed the former.
Most of the time this theory will not cause any problems and results in the same conclusions as Feinberg's. If you cut off my arm then I will be harmed under Feinberg's theory as, other things being equal, I will be worse off. I will also be harmed under Harris's account as a surgeon would be negligent if they failed to repair the damage if they could and I have a rational preference to not have a missing arm. However, Harris's account runs into a number of problems in harder cases. The first is that it is too expansive and so leads to conclusions Harris may well, or perhaps should, be unwilling to accept given his writings on other topics. Under Harris's definition of harm it will be impossible to avoid causing harm if one chooses to have children. This is because everybody has certain characteristics that they might rationally prefer not to have. One might rationally prefer to be taller, less susceptible to common colds, have better eyesight, not die of old age, look like Elizabeth Taylor or Paul Newman in their prime or be more intelligent. In fact, if you picked any random individual existing on the planet you would certainly be able to find something, even if it is only minor, that is wrong with them. Something that one might rationally prefer to be improved and that a doctor would be considered negligent for not rectifying in an unconscious patient if they could. The implication of Harris's account is therefore that we are all harmed by existence because we could always rationally prefer to be in a better condition than the one we currently are in. If existence is a harmed state this means that those who cause people to be in such a condition -namely their parents -have caused harm. As a result, having children will always cause harm.
It is not open to Harris to say that a doctor would not be negligent for failing to find a cure to the common cold or administer the elixir of life as none is currently available. 
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Leaving aside the fact that Harris does not convincingly explain why an individual being harmed is dependent on whether another healthier person is waiting in the wings to replace them, if Harris does not accept that it is wrong to have children even though they will be harmed then there must be no duty to avoid causing harm. This is because, as Brassington has said, it is blameworthy to fail to fulfil a duty. 29 As we cannot be blamed for not performing the impossible, we cannot have a duty to do the impossible. Accordingly, if parents are allowed to have children then bringing them to birth in a non-harmed state (in other words, performing a duty to avoid causing harm) would be impossible. The failure to fulfil this duty not to cause harm will therefore not be blameable so it will not be a duty at all. This is the second unpalatable conclusion of Harris's account: it potentially sees causing harm as being completely morally unproblematic.
27 David Benatar, 'Why it is Better Never to Come into Existence ' (1997) Feinberg's conception of harm bringing a child into existence only causes them harm if the child has a life that is not worthwhile (i.e. if they are worse off by being alive and so better off dead) and that is the only state they could be in. Given these problems, it is difficult to see why
Harris's account of harm should displace Feinberg's.
The 'Blighty Wound' Soldier
Why then might we be tempted to adopt Harris's view? Harris believes that it explains situations where we supposedly harm another even though they benefit overall. An illustration he gives in support of this is that of the 'Blighty wound' soldier, where in the First World War soldiers would shoot themselves in the foot in order to be sent home to England. 30 Harris states that adopting the counterfactual account would deprive us of describing these soldiers as being harmed as they are better off overall, whereas under his account they are harmed -people rationally prefer not to have foot injuries -but not wronged. Harris believes the intuitive reaction people have that the soldier is harmed undermines Feinberg's counterfactual account.
However, assuming that Harris is correct to state that the soldier is harmed, this may not pose a problem for Feinberg's theory. The soldier has caused themselves a serious injury so their interest in having a healthy foot is set back quite radically. They are likely to be permanently disabled, have exposed themselves to a serious risk of gangrene, amputation, even death and, at the very least, will be court-martialled and punished if found out. Many back in 'Blighty' might view them as cowardly. We might therefore be tempted to agree with Harris that the soldier is harmed. Kahane and Savulescu's theory therefore rests on an intuitive distinction between list
(1) and list (2). They critique several possible reasons for this before proposing that statistical normality provides the best explanation for this intuition. Accordingly, statistical normality, they believe, must be morally important in discovering whether someone is harmed. That is, as the conditions in list (1) fall below what is statistically normal putting someone in such a condition will cause them harm and as the items in list (2) are statistically normal they will not be harms. To avoid repetition I will outline their justifications for this in more detail when exploring the weaknesses of their argument in the following sections.
Under the counterfactual account of harm the things in list (2) could theoretically be harms. People might have an interest in having great artistic talent or living to be 130 years old, for example. Thwarting these interests would make a person worse off and so they would be harmed. However, we must remember that the counterfactual account requires, in order for an individual to be harmed, their interests to be setback in 'the normal course of events insofar as they were reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances'. 37 There is presently no course of conduct that could be performed that would mean a person with the conditions in list (2) Given this, the 'serious problems' that Kahane and Savulescu believe the counterfactual account faces are not ones that it faces in our world at present. They are merely theoretical.
And, being theoretical, any intuitions that are generated by such thought experiments are not ones that can be relied on in this world. It may be that if there was a world where it is foreseeable that people could live to be 130 years old and their lives were then cut short then people in that world would see such actions are harmful. Kahane and Savulescu appear, therefore, not to have fully grasped the nuances of the counterfactual account and this is not a promising start for their theory. Nonetheless, their arguments can be refuted in other ways and so I will ignore this flaw for the rest of this paper.
The Problematic First Premise
The first problem with Kahane and Savulescu's argument comes from their acceptance that the intuitive distinction concerning lists (1) and (2) is morally relevant for determining whether someone is harmed. Even if one concedes that people do have an intuition that the items on list
(1) are worse than those in list (2), Kahane and Savulescu provide us with no evidence whatsoever that this intuition is, as they claim, a 'normative' 38 one.
The trouble with relying solely on intuitions is that they are often unreliable. If one person intuits that X is bad and another that X is permissible then relying solely on intuition does not tell us how we should proceed. The mere fact people intuit a difference between list
(1) and list (2) therefore tells us nothing normative.
idea that we should blindly follow the intuitions of the majority is unconvincing. For a start, a cursory look at history shows that the majority of people have held all sorts of questionable beliefs. At one point most people intuited that throwing 'witches' in ponds or owning slaves was perfectly acceptable behaviour.
Many people, for example, have an intuition that human cloning is wrong. 40 But in an article supporting human cloning Julian Savulescu himself wrote:
[T]he fact that people find something repulsive does not settle whether it is wrong.
The achievement in applied ethics, if there is one, of the last 50 years has been to get people to rise above their gut feelings and examine the reasons for a practice.
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It is hard to disagree. How peculiar, then, that Savulescu and Kahane elevate their gut feelings concerning the items in (1) and (2) without fully considering whether this intuitive distinction is morally important.
After all, a non-moral explanation can be suggested for the intuitive distinction between the two lists: such intuitions could simply be a result of our evolved responses to such scenarios.
Thousands of years ago our ancestors would have seen being severely intellectually impaired, paraplegic, blindness or dying in one's twenties as undesirable because these conditions would all be things that would hinder their chances of reproducing. As these conditions would have prevented people passing on their genes, natural selection will have given us evolutionary reasons to avoid these conditions. Our evolved response to the things in list (1) is to have a gutfeeling that they are harms.
The same cannot be said of the items in list (2). To have an IQ of less than 160, to lack great artistic talent or to live less than 130 years were not only unnecessary for people to pass on their genes thousands of years ago, but they are not even required for it now. Natural selection will not have provided us with aversions to being in such circumstances as any alternative would not be available to our ancestors or particularly advantageous in enabling them to reproduce. Natural selection may have equipped us with intuitions that the items in list
(1) are bad if we are to pass on our genes but those in list (2) are not bad for this purpose.
This distinction is not necessarily morally significant however. As Peter Singer has stated, 'The direction of evolution neither follows nor has any necessary connection with, the path to moral progress'. 42 Indeed, just because something is good at helping people pass on their genes does not mean that it is good morally.
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If Kahane and Savulescu want to rely on this intuition to show that the concept of harm should be redefined then they need to present a reason why the fact people (might) maintain an intuitive distinction between list (1) and list (2) renders this distinction morally important. This is something they fail to do. Accordingly they do not provide enough evidence to convincingly conclude that it is the counterfactual concept of harm that should be changed rather than the, supposedly widely-held, intuition people have regarding their two lists. Without this, Kahane and Savulescu's argument for the importance of statistical normality in determining whether someone is harmed rests on insecure foundations.
Kahane and Savulescu try to extricate themselves from these difficulties by stating:
'Those who reject our premises will naturally find our argument of limited interest.' . 43 Alternatively, we may simply be that we have been educated to see list (1) as harms whereas, given alternatives to the things in list (2) are not something any of us will have encountered growing up, we have not been taught to see the latter as harms. 44 Kahane and Savulescu, 'The Concept of Harm' 320. an argument to show that their premises are sound, otherwise their proposition is questionbegging. Kahane and Savulescu have failed to do this with their first premise and so they cannot simply dismiss any rebuttals based on this and continue to argue that statistical normality is morally important. Given, therefore, that the initial premise of Kahane and Savulescu's theory is uncompelling, it is hard not to conclude that their account of harm is inferior to the counterfactual one.
Statistical Normality
Let us now be generous and presume that the intuition we have that list (1) is worse than list (2) is a normative one. Does this mean that statistical normality provides a satisfactory account of what it means to be harmed? In this section I will show that it does not and highlight that Kahane and Savulescu's theory of harm leads to results that are far more counterintuitivesomething they place great importance on -than the counterfactual account of harm.
Imagine there is a disease that has swept the population of Ruritania. Eighty per cent of the population has it and it causes them chronic pain. It is easily curable. Twenty per cent of the population do not have the disease. In this scenario the disease that the eighty per cent suffer from is statistically normal. The mode, mean and median of people suffer from it. If what is statistically normal was to determine whether a person was harmed then people are not harmed by suffering from chronic pain even though it could be easily cured. Furthermore, if say, only forty per cent of the population had this disease then there would be nothing to prevent someone, under Kahane and Savulesu's account of harm, injecting as many people as possible with the disease in order to make the disease statistically normal and thus not a harm. Under this theory, causing someone to be in chronic pain would not cause them harm even if doing so brought no other benefits. Such problems do not, of course, arise under the counterfactual account as we could describe these people as harmed because, by not being cured, they are worse off than they otherwise would be in the normal course of events.
If we are concerned with the interests of people there are good reasons to reject Kahane and Savulescu's account of harm. Provided you end up being above what is statistically normal it would sanction the reduction of your welfare even when this did not improve the welfare of others. Whacking, say, a modern-day Michaelangelo over the head so that he could no longer paint something as great as the Sistine Chapel would not be to cause him harm under Kahane and Saulescu's theory provided he could still paint better than the average person. This would be so even if no one else was benefitted by such spiteful actions. 45 The mere fact that list (1) sometimes correlates with what is statistical normal, whereas those in list (2) account for the idea that list (1) is generally worse than list (2) in most circumstances because of the fact of diminishing marginal utility.
If something exhibits diminishing marginal utility then, according to Greene and Baron, 'the more of that good an individual has, the less valuable having more of it will be to that
46 This is because one tends to put off buying goods with less utility per pound until after one has bought more essential, basic goods. 47 Simmonds provides a good illustration of this. He states:
Expressed very simply, this theory entails that an additional £1 given to a millionaire will make a negligible contribution to his welfare, whereas £1 given to a very poor man might make a significant contribution to his welfare, enabling him, say, to buy a meal that he could not otherwise afford.
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Greene and Baron performed a study which showed that the utility people place on a wide range of goods -including extended lifespan -is marginally declining. 49 If we must accept, as
Kahane and Savulescu maintain, that any difference between list (1) and list (2) is a moral one this may explain why the items in list (1) are considered worse than those in (2).
The items in list (1), things such as blindness, paraplegia or having a short lifespan, are invariably things that if they were removed would bring much greater utility than the items in list (2), things such as lacking artistic talent or not having a really long lifespan. A person who has an IQ of 75 is more likely to get a greater benefit from having their IQ increased by 10 points than someone with an IQ of 150 would. this is why people might have an intuitive reaction that list (1) is worse than list (2). However, this does not mean that the items in list (2) are not harms at all or even, in particular circumstances, not serious harms.
Whether someone is harmed is context-specific. The fact that diminishing marginal utility provides an explanation for the intuitive distinction merely means that generally the items in list (2) do not make life go as bad as those in list (1) and so are usually minor harms.
Statistical normality is therefore not the only cogent explanation for any intuitive distinction that people may have between Kahane and Savulescu's lists -the counterfactual account of harm provides a more plausible explanation of why list (1) might be perceived as making people worse off than list (2).
Kahane and Savulescu try to get around this by arguing that 'We can stipulate, for our purposes, that enjoyment of these conditions [in list (2)] would significantly increase wellbeing, and that they would do so to roughly the same extent that the conditions listed in list (1) decrease it.' 50 However, this stipulation is not open to them logically. In our world it is not possible that the conditions in list (2) are as equally bad or reduce welfare to the same extent as the items in list (1) and so any intuitions that are generated as a result of this are untrustworthy. Stipulating that not being as good a playwright as Shakespeare is the equivalent in terms of setbacks to welfare as being blind is the equivalent of stipulating that two plus two equals five, or that being tortured to death is equal to having ten pounds stolen off you: it is so difficult, if not impossible, for us to even comprehend such a thing that any intuitions generated are of dubious reliability in our present world. This 'stipulation' is therefore not a good enough escape route for Savulescu and Kahane and they cannot simply presume that list (1) and list (2) are equally serious.
It is unsurprising, though, that Kahane and Savulescu do not tackle this problem headon and list examples of things that do equally setback welfare in our world. This is because if they actually used examples that did increase or decrease welfare to the same extent then our intuitions would probably indicate that both lists contain harms and their whole argument would be undermined. Accordingly, Kahane and Savulescu must provide examples in their lists that actually reduce welfare to the same extent if any intuitions regarding the two lists are to be useful.
Without doing this, they cannot rebut the idea that diminishing marginal utility indicates that list (1) and list (2) are unlikely to reduce an individual's welfare to the same extent. This means the items in list (1) will setback welfare to a greater extent than those in list (2) will and so can be perceived as more serious harms under to the counterfactual account. Kahane and Savulescu therefore do not show that the counterfactual account of harm is an inadequate theory.
Conclusion
It has been said that harm is 'a subject of special moral concern because harm is presumptively bad to suffer and presumptively wrong to inflict.' 51 It is therefore essential that we adopt a definition of the concept that is philosophically coherent. The counterfactual account of harm is capable of withstanding such scrutiny and this article has defended it from two challenges.
It has been shown that the theories of harm proposed by Harris, Kahane and Savulescu are internally inconsistent and contain a number of flaws. Both the 'harmed state' and the 'statistical normality' accounts lead to conclusions that, even if their respective authors were willing to accept them, are unlikely to be satisfactory for anyone else. As a result, the attacks 
